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A firm’s book equity is a measure of the value held by a firm’s ordinary shareholders. 
Increasingly, it is being reported as a negative number. Since the firm’s limited 
liability structure means that shareholders’ value cannot be negative value, negative 
book equity has no obvious interpretation. Consequently, both practitioners and 
academics typically omit such stocks. While these stocks are small in number they are 
disproportionately represented in extreme value/growth sectors, and therefore can 
have an impact on applications where “value” is defined in terms of book equity. We 
propose a new approach that classifies negative book equity stocks across the 
value/growth spectrum by considering how close their returns correspond to stocks 
that fit more obviously into these classifications. We find that this new value factor, 
which includes negative book equity stock, is economically and statistically different 
from the old value factor that excludes such stocks. Although we illustrate how this 
approach can be used to classify negative book equity stock, the approach is quite 
general and may be used whenever particular accounting data are unavailable or 
otherwise suspect. 
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A firm’s book equity is a measure of the value held by a firm’s ordinary shareholders. 
Increasingly, it is being reported as a negative number. Since the firm’s limited 
liability structure means that shareholders’ value cannot be negative value, negative 
book equity has no obvious interpretation. Consequently, both practitioners and 
academics typically omit such stocks. While these stocks are small in number they are 
disproportionately represented in extreme value/growth sectors, and therefore can 
have an impact on applications where “value” is defined in terms of book equity. We 
propose a new approach that classifies negative book equity stocks across the 
value/growth spectrum by considering how close their returns correspond to stocks 
that fit more obviously into these classifications. We find that this new value factor, 
which includes negative book equity stock, is economically and statistically different 
from the old value factor that excludes such stocks. Although we illustrate how this 
approach can be used to classify negative book equity stock, the approach is quite 
general and may be used whenever particular accounting data are unavailable or 
otherwise suspect. 
1 Introduction 
A firm’s book equity (BE) represents the difference between the firm’s assets and 
liabilities. It is a measure of the equity held by a firm’s ordinary shareholders.1 
Penman (1992) and Ohlson (1995) argue that BE is a fundamental index of firm value. 
Fama and French (1992) use the cross sectional dispersion of the ratio of BE to 
market value of equity (ME) to construct a value index for asset pricing. 
                                                 
1 Normally preferred stock is also included in book equity; however, in this context it is excluded (see 
discussion Section 2.2). 
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Occasionally, BE is negative. A firm’s limited liability structure means that 
shareholders cannot have negative value, so negative BE is difficult to interpret. 
Consequently, academics and practitioners exclude negative BE stocks from analysis, 
arguing that they are high default risk.2 But here is a paradox: if we exclude negative 
BE stocks then continuity arguments suggest that we should also consider excluding 
high-growth stocks, which constitute the smallest category of BE relative to ME. 
Another argument for excluding negative BE stocks is that such stocks are few, 
and their omission should have an insignificant effect in any data application. 
However, since the late 1980s a greater incidence of firm losses has meant that the 
number of stocks with negative BE has increased dramatically, to the point where 
approximately 5% of all listed stocks have negative BE today. Furthermore, we argue 
that these stocks have a significant effect on value-based asset pricing models (for 
example, Fama and French (1992)), since we would expect that they constitute a 
much greater percentage of stocks that fall in the extremes of the growth/value 
continuum. 
So, if we are to include negative BE stocks in current asset pricing models, the 
challenge is to appropriately classify them into value groups. Since these stocks have 
no intuitive interpretation in terms of “value,” to which value category should such 
stocks belong? According to the conventional method of sorting stocks into portfolios 
based on their BE/ME values, negative BE stocks, when not omitted altogether, are 
inevitably grouped into the same lowest BE/ME portfolio.3 If they fall into the lowest 
BE/ME ratio, can it be assumed that they have the highest growth potential? Or are 
they financially distressed firms that fall into some other classification? While many 
                                                 
2 Indeed, following on Fama and French (1992) most empirical research in accounting and finance (e.g., 
Vassalou and Xing (2004) and/or Griffin and Lemmon (2002)) exclude negative BE stocks for this 
reason. 
3 Chan et al. (1991) represents one of the few studies that does not simply omit negative BE stocks. 
However, they classify them within the lowest value category. 
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negative BE stocks are indeed financially distressed, reasons for reporting negative 
BE vary. For this reason it is not clear that they should fall into any particular BE/ME 
classification. 
Our contribution is to apply a simple approach to classifying negative BE 
stocks across the value/growth spectrum by considering how close their returns 
correspond to stocks that fit more obviously into this classification scheme. We 
neither discard these stocks nor do we arbitrarily assign them to the same lowest 
BE/ME portfolio. We draw upon a well-known procedure used to allocate mutual 
funds and hedge funds into style categories (Brown and Goetzmann ,1997; Brown 
Goetzmann , 2003) and more recently used to group individual securities into basis 
asset portfolios used in asset pricing studies (Brown, Goetzmann and Grinblatt, 1998; 
Ahn, Conrad and Dittmar, 2007). To present, it has not been applied to the problem of 
allocating individual stocks to value or growth classifications. Although we illustrate 
how this approach can be used to classify negative book equity stock, it is general and 
may be used for any accounting data which is unavailable or difficult to interpret. 
Once we correctly classify negative BE stocks, we find that most do not fall 
into the highest growth classification. They are more similar to value stocks. 
Including these stocks in the value group leads to an enhanced value premium. 
However, there is an important caveat. Many of these stocks that enter the high value 
category are indeed financially distressed, which is consistent with Fama and French 
(1992), who identify value as a distress risk factor. As a practical matter, this confirms 
the wisdom of incorporating a default risk screen on any investment strategy designed 
to exploit the observed value premium. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide details about our 
data set, factor construction, and the procedure we propose to classify negative BE 
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stocks. Section 3 discusses the results of our empirical analysis and Section 4 
concludes. 
2  Data and Methods 
2.1 Data 
To facilitate comparison with the value premium documented in Fama and French 
(1993), we use a similar data set. Monthly returns and relevant accounting 
information for stocks trading on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX) and NASDAQ are taken from the merged 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT database provided through the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP). 
To be included in the study, a stock must satisfy the following conditions, 
consistent with Fama and French (1993): 
• It must have CRSP monthly prices for December of year t-1 and June of year t; 
• It must have COMPUSTAT book common equity for year t-1; 
• In order to calculate its size, it must have shares outstanding; 
• In order to avoid the survivorship bias inherent in the COMPUSTAT database, 
it must have appeared on COMPUSTAT for at least two years; 
• Finally, the share type must be an ordinary common equity (Share Type of 10 
or 11 in CRSP data file), which means that American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs), Real Estate Investment Trust (REITs) and units of beneficial interest 
are excluded.4 
                                                 
4 While Fama and French (1992) exclude financial firms, we also consider the implications of including 
such stocks on the results we report. 
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Unlike Fama and French (1992) who use data from as early as 1963, our study begins 
in 1986. There are numerous reasons for choosing 1986 as the starting year. As Fama 
and French (1993) point out, negative BE stocks are rare before 1980. The number of 
negative BE firms has increased since 1980 because the incidence of firm losses has 
increased (Givoly and Hayn 2000). This, in turn, may be caused by the growing 
accounting conservatism reported by Roychowdhury and Watts (2007). As depicted in 
Figure 1, the number of negative BE stocks doesn’t exceed 100 until 1985, and 
dramatically increases from 1986 onward. Therefore, the years prior to 1986 are 
relatively unimportant in the context of this study.5 
Figure 1. Number of negative BE Stocks. 
0
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1970 1976 1982 1988 1994 2000
Financial Stocks Inc Financial Stocks Excl  
Note: The shaded areas denote recession periods, as defined by The National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER).6 
                                                 
5 Fama and French (1992) used 1990 as the last year in their study. We, on the other hand, choose 2004 
as our last year because these are the latest data available to us. 
6 There have been two recessions since 1990. The early 1990s recession is from July 1990 to March 
1991. The most recent one is from March 2001 to November 2001. Since negative BE stock are 
distressed, we expect their numbers to increase during recessions. This is not always the case (see 
Figure 1). 
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2.2 Classification of negative BE stocks and construction of size 
and value indices 
BE, as defined by Fama and French (1993), is the COMPUSTAT book value of 
stockholders’ equity, plus balance-sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if 
available), minus the book value of preferred stock. The book value of preferred stock 
is estimated based on the redemption, liquidation, or par value (in this order), subject 
to availability. 
Consider how the separate components of this definition can cause a firm to 
have negative BE. Shareholder’s equity represents the capital received from investors 
in exchange for stock and retained earnings as recorded on the balance sheet. Firms in 
financial distress will typically accumulate negative retained earnings, and this 
negative retention may be large enough to imply a negative value for BE. However, it 
is possible that a firm in an otherwise sound financial condition might record a 
negative value for BE. For example, negative BE can occur through the accounting 
treatment of goodwill when companies with significant growth potential are taken 
over by larger companies.7 Also, it can occur when start-ups with patents but no 
products “eat” into their equity. If they can easily raise capital, they are not truly 
“distressed.” There are inconsistencies between balance sheet accounting and the way 
the government measure what should be taxed. Typically, accountants are more 
conservative and allow provisions for any additional tax that might be paid. 
Essentially, balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit adjusts the 
                                                 
7 Goodwill is an accounting term used to reflect the portion of the market value of a business entity not 
directly attributable to its assets and liabilities. When AOL took over Time Warner, it recorded 
goodwill equal to the differences between the price paid and the value of net assets acquired, which 
was $126.9 billion. In 2002, AOL adopted accounting standard SFAS No. 142, which stated that 
companies self-examine their book value goodwill relative to its fair value and if overstated, recognize 
the difference as a lump sum “goodwill impairment loss.” This occurred in January 2002, when $54.24 
billion of goodwill was written off by AOL. 
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conservative accounting so that it is consistent with the taxes that must be paid. It is 
possible for these adjustments to create negative BE for a firm. The effect of preferred 
stock on BE must be removed too. If the redemption value of this preferred stock is 
larger than the book value, it can cause an otherwise profitable firm to have negative 
BE. 
A brief analysis of the negative BE stocks in our sample reveals that 77% are 
from the NASDAQ and 11% are from NYSE and 12% are from AMEX. Furthermore, 
the top 3 industries of these stocks are: Computer Programming (10%), 
Pharmaceutical (5%) and Oil and Gas extraction (5%). This industry breakdown 
makes sense in light of our discussion of the causes of negative BE, since often stocks 
in these industries comprise ‘start-ups’ which ‘eat’ into their capital. 
Rather than simply discard negative BE firms, we classify these firms into 
Fama and French value categories based on how similar their return history is to that 
of positive BE firms that belong more obviously to the value categories (described in 
Section 2.2). The classification approach, referred to as generalized style classification 
(GSC), was proposed by Brown and Goetzmann (1992) as a way to classify mutual 
funds into style categories based on similarities in returns on a month-by-month basis. 
Brown, Goetzmann and Grinblatt (1998) and Ahn, Conrad and Dittmar (2007) 
propose using variants of this approach to classify individual securities into industry- 
or factor-related groupings.8 It is an intuitive approach to allocating negative BE 
stocks into the conventional Fama and French (1993) BE/ME and size groupings. 
Stocks with positive book value are first allocated to six classes stratified according to 
size and value using the procedure described in Fama and French (1993). Each 
                                                 
8 The technique is a natural fit with the theoretical returns generating process for stocks and is 
consistent with a variety of asset pricing paradigms (see the Appendix of Brown and Goetzmann 
(1997)). 
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negative BE stock is then allocated into one of these groups, based on how similar its 
historical returns are to those stocks already allocated to the group.9 
 We then construct Fama and French Small minus Big (SMB) and High minus 
Low (HML) factors using NYSE stock returns exactly as described in Fama and 
French (1993), with the exception that instead of discarding negative BE stocks, we 
include them in the analysis using the GSC approach described above. Using only 
NYSE listed stocks, we calculate size rankings based on market capitalization in June 
of each year t. The median NYSE size is then used to split NYSE, NASDAQ and 
AMEX stocks into two groups: small (S) and big (B). These size rankings are used to 
construct size portfolios from July of year t to June of year t+1. Similarly, NYSE, 
NASDAQ and AMEX stocks are broken into three BE/ME groups based on the 
NYSE breakpoints for the bottom 30% (L), middle 40% (M) and top 30% (H) of the 
ranked values of BE/ME. The value factor (HML) is formed from the six portfolios 
presented above and is the equal weighted average of the returns on the two portfolios 
of high BE/MEs minus those of the low BE/MEs: 
HML = [(SH) + (BH)) - ((SL) + (BL)] / 2 (1) 
 
3 Results 
When we use the returns-based GSC procedure to allocate negative BE stocks to 
value classifications, we find that Fama and French’s value premium is enhanced. 
Panel A of Table 1 shows the number of stocks and their size by year. Over 
time, the number of positive BE and negative BE stocks fluctuate. However, the 
                                                 
9 The Generalized Style Classification (GSC) approach of  Brown and Goetzmann, 1997 is a quasi-k-
means clustering algorithm. The main difference between GSC and the traditional k-means is that the 
GSC algorithm adjusts for heteroskedasticity by taking into consideration both time-series and cross-
sectional variances, reducing the effect of outliers in the classification. 
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median market capitalization (i.e., size) increases for both. The positive BE stocks 
greatly outnumber the negative BE stocks and the median size is consistently three to 
four times larger. Panel B shows that the negative BE stocks account from 3.5% to 
5.7% (when equal value weighted) of all stocks. In the case of non-financial stocks, 
the percentage of negative BE stocks increases to between 3.6% and 6.2%. 
Fama and French use market value weighting in the construction of their HML 
portfolio since it is difficult and costly to replicate an equally weighted portfolio due 
to the many allotments of small parcels of stocks that need to be purchased. In terms 
of value weighting, the negative BE stocks represent anywhere from 0.38% to 1.57% 
(as exhibited in the second column of Panel B). If we exclude financial firms, these 
figures also increase from 0.38% to 1.79%. This increase is expected since most 
negative BE stocks are small firms. Indeed, their median sizes are approximately one-
third of those of positive BE stocks.  
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Table 1. Sample Characteristics 
Panel A. Sample Number and Size, by Year
Year Stocks Median Mean Stocks Median Mean Stocks Median Mean Stocks Median Mean
1986 4189 64 566 148 16 61 3732 55 546 133 16 58
1987 4354 58 622 179 18 90 3858 51 621 162 19 93
1988 4452 45 541 201 15 91 3931 41 543 181 13 94
1989 4345 52 614 231 13 182 3782 45 612 213 13 194
1990 4242 53 685 238 12 138 3693 46 694 218 12 146
1991 4246 54 720 241 16 153 3689 49 729 219 16 162
1992 4285 76 826 243 17 120 3695 68 826 223 18 122
1993 4586 90 921 225 27 207 3967 78 900 205 29 221
1994 5460 79 785 218 28 280 4346 79 824 204 28 287
1995 5703 90 936 223 39 289 4535 94 993 205 42 294
1996 5842 118 1161 218 56 321 4700 127 1211 205 60 329
1997 6209 123 1404 228 36 305 5090 121 1403 214 38 313
1998 5992 147 1880 269 50 468 4956 140 1821 256 52 490
1999 5548 136 2403 251 68 685 4566 134 2419 239 67 707
2000 5352 147 2879 238 85 766 4333 166 3080 227 89 792
2001 5192 163 2530 216 51 613 4175 189 2544 206 51 638
2002 4778 174 2292 245 43 397 3818 182 2249 236 43 404
2003 4473 208 2440 192 65 752 3524 223 2433 188 67 762
2004 4325 325 3021 163 101 853 3404 363 3028 156 101 866
Panel B. Percentage of Negative BE Stocks/Positive BE Stocks, by Year
Financial Stocks Included Financial Stocks Excluded
Equally Weight Value Weight Equally Weight Value Weight
1986 3.5% 0.38% 3.6% 0.38%
1987 4.1% 0.59% 4.2% 0.63%
1988 4.5% 0.76% 4.6% 0.80%
1989 5.3% 1.57% 5.6% 1.79%
1990 5.6% 1.13% 5.9% 1.24%
1991 5.7% 1.21% 5.9% 1.32%
1992 5.7% 0.82% 6.0% 0.88%
1993 4.9% 1.10% 5.2% 1.27%
1994 4.0% 1.42% 4.7% 1.63%
1995 3.9% 1.21% 4.5% 1.34%
1996 3.7% 1.03% 4.4% 1.19%
1997 3.7% 0.80% 4.2% 0.94%
1998 4.5% 1.12% 5.2% 1.39%
1999 4.5% 1.29% 5.2% 1.53%
2000 4.4% 1.18% 5.2% 1.35%
2001 4.2% 1.01% 4.9% 1.24%
2002 5.1% 0.89% 6.2% 1.11%
2003 4.3% 1.32% 5.3% 1.67%
2004 3.8% 1.06% 4.6% 1.31%
Size ($M)
Positive BE Stocks
Financial Stocks Included
Negative BE Stocks
Size ($M)
Financial Stocks Excluded
Positive BE Stocks Negative BE Stocks
Size ($M) Size ($M)
 
Note: Size is measured as price per share multiplied by shares outstanding in June of each year. Value 
weight is measured as total capitalization in June of negative BE stocks divided by total capitalization 
in June of Positive BE stocks. 
 
 
 Initially, one might presume that such small value weightings would not play 
an important role in altering the value premium, HML. However, if we break down 
the HML portfolio into its six constitute portfolios (SL, SM, SH, BL, BM and BH), 
we find that negative BE stocks play a crucial role in changing the magnitude of the 
value premium. This can be seen in Table 2. 
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Table 2. Percentage of Capitalization (Negative BE Stocks/Positive Stocks) 
Year SH SM SL BH BM BL SH SM SL BH BM BL
1986 0.6% 1.8% 1.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.6% 0.6% 2.0% 1.4% 0.2% 0.1% 1.0%
1987 0.1% 0.0% 0.5% 1.2% 0.3% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.6% 1.6% 0.1% 0.0%
1988 1.4% 11.5% 3.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 1.7% 11.5% 2.6% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3%
1989 10.5% 11.6% 5.5% 0.8% 0.1% 0.2% 11.3% 14.0% 21.0% 0.6% 0.1% 0.0%
1990 0.4% 0.0% 0.3% 1.9% 1.5% 0.0% 0.16% 0.00% 0.30% 0.51% 2.59% 0.05%
1991 0.0% 0.2% 1.4% 0.1% 3.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 1.0% 3.8% 0.3% 0.0%
1992 0.0% 0.0% 22.6% 0.0% 0.1% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 24.3% 0.2% 0.0% 0.6%
1993 0.1% 0.0% 5.7% 2.4% 1.2% 0.1% 0.3% 0.0% 4.5% 6.9% 0.3% 0.2%
1994 0.0% 0.8% 37.5% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 39.9% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
1995 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 1.0% 2.7% 0.0%
1996 1.6% 5.6% 1.1% 0.2% 0.0% 1.6% 12.7% 7.6% 1.0% 1.4% 0.1% 0.7%
1997 0.0% 0.0% 21.7% 0.3% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 22.4% 1.0% 0.0% 0.0%
1998 0.7% 0.1% 1.5% 10.3% 1.1% 0.4% 0.9% 0.2% 0.8% 13.0% 2.2% 0.4%
1999 1.8% 2.8% 0.7% 23.2% 0.7% 0.0% 1.9% 1.9% 0.1% 18.5% 2.9% 0.1%
2000 1.9% 51.3% 5.1% 0.0% 0.3% 0.2% 6.3% 61.3% 4.6% 0.0% 1.1% 0.2%
2001 0.5% 2.0% 2.4% 2.5% 1.8% 0.5% 0.3% 2.8% 2.1% 3.3% 2.6% 0.6%
2002 0.9% 0.2% 1.0% 0.1% 0.4% 1.5% 0.1% 0.3% 1.1% 0.1% 0.7% 1.6%
2003 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 2.9% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 4.4% 0.1%
2004 0.0% 1.2% 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 0.1% 1.7% 12.2% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6%
Financial Stocks ExcludedFinancial Stocks Included
 
Note: Size is measured as price per share multiplied by shares outstanding in June of each year. 
 
 Table 2 shows that adding the negative BE stocks into the six pre-determined 
portfolios changes their composition (i.e., market capitalization), though the 
magnitudes of such changes vary. First, if we consider the effect on the size portfolios, 
we can see that the three small portfolios (SH, SM and SL) are the ones most affected. 
For example, the market capitalization of the SL portfolio changed by more than 10% 
in 1992, 1994, 1997 and 2004. Second, the value risk factor is also changed by at least 
10% (see Table 2) for half the years in the sample (1988, 1989, 1992, 1994, 1997-
2000 and 2004). In other words, including negative BE stocks changes the 
composition of the HML portfolios and significantly influences overall return, even 
though negative BE stocks represent only 1.57% (at most) of the value of all stocks.10 
 If non-financial stocks are considered, similar patterns are observed. As shown 
in Table 1, the exclusion of financial stocks results in a 17% decrease in the number 
of stocks. However, this only causes a 7% drop in the number of negative BE stocks. 
                                                 
10 We shall see in Section 4 that only the highest probability of default risk negative BE stocks are 
crucial in determining the enhanced returns of the HML portfolio. 
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The disproportionate decrease in the number of negative BE stocks results in the 
negative BE stocks having a larger impact on the value premium. 
 The impact of including negative BE stocks on the returns of the HML factor 
is shown in Table 3. In the case of value weighted portfolios that include financial 
stock, the average difference between the value premium that includes positive stocks 
only (HMLold) and that which includes negative BE stocks (HMLnew) is 0.9%. This 
difference is larger – 1.1% – in the non-financial case.11 
Table 3. Annualized Returns for HML 
Value-weighted Annualized Returns of HML, by Year
Year Positive BE Stocks Only All Stocks Positive BE Stocks Only All Stocks
1986 7.3% 7.9% 10.8% 11.5%
1987 14.5% 14.7% 16.4% 16.7%
1988 6.9% 7.9% 6.7% 7.7%
1989 -13.6% -14.2% -11.1% -9.1%
1990 -4.2% -4.3% -4.1% -3.8%
1991 4.9% 4.4% 0.0% 0.0%
1992 13.3% 13.0% 12.9% 12.4%
1993 6.3% 6.8% 6.3% 6.8%
1994 -4.1% -2.9% -3.3% -2.2%
1995 -1.4% -1.5% -3.3% -3.3%
1996 10.4% 11.8% 4.0% 5.1%
1997 9.9% 8.1% 8.4% 6.4%
1998 -15.0% -13.6% -11.7% -9.7%
1999 -26.4% -23.9% -27.0% -23.4%
2000 56.2% 61.1% 56.4% 61.6%
2001 31.7% 34.8% 31.4% 33.1%
2002 -11.4% -11.5% -13.5% -13.8%
2003 9.8% 9.7% 8.9% 8.8%
2004 14.8% 18.2% 15.5% 19.1%
Financial Stocks Included Financial Stocks Excluded
 
Note: A stock’s size is calculated by multiplying its price by its shares outstanding. NYSE stocks are ranked according to their 
sizes. The median is then used to split all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks into two groups: small (S) and big (B). Similarly, 
NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX stocks are sorted into three BE/ME groups based on the breakpoints for the bottom 30% (L), 
middle 40% (M) and top 30% (H). BE, book common equity (for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1), is defined as the 
COMPUSTAT book value of stockholders’ equity plus balance-sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit (if available), 
minus the book value of preferred stock. The book value of preferred stock is estimated based on the redemption, liquidation, or 
par value (in this order), subject to availability. For the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1, market equity (ME) is obtained by 
multiplying a stock price in December of year t-1 by its shares outstanding. From July of year t to June of year t+1, six value-
weighted portfolios (SL, SM, SH, BL, BM and BH) are created as the intersection of size and BE/ME groups. HML is the 
difference between the average return of the two highest portfolios and the two lowest portfolios. The figures in the above table 
are annualized based on monthly returns. 
 
 From Table 3 we can see that by adding negative BE stocks into the portfolios 
that constitute the HML factor, the value premium is increased or “enhanced.” This is 
                                                 
11 Barber and Lyon (1997) confirm that the inclusion of financial stocks has minimal impact on value 
factor returns. 
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to be expected, since, if negative BE stocks are predominantly (but not exclusively) 
distressed stocks, they need higher returns to compensate for the risk of bearing them. 
 The accumulated returns for HMLnew and HMLold for portfolios over the 18-
year study period are illustrated in Figure 2  The 
differences in HML returns for the portfolios that include and exclude financial stocks 
are 17% and 20%, respectively. The t-values estimated on annual returns are 2.4 and 
2.8, respectively, indicating that the returns between the new and old HML are 
significant at 95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 2. Accumulative HML with and without inclusion of negative BE Stocks 
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In related work12 we attempt to understand these results. We consider the 
relationship between stock default risks,13 returns and their BE/ME ratios. Consistent 
with a risk/return interpretation of the value factor, we find that the negative BE 
                                                 
12 Li et al. (2007) 
 
13 As a proxy for a stocks’ default risk, we adopt an option-based default risk model that predicts the 
probability of bankruptcy.
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stocks with the highest probability of default have higher average returns than all 
positive BE stocks. We find that not only do these stocks have a higher return than 
other stocks, but they also group into value/growth portfolios in such a way as to 
enhance HML returns. This enhancement represents an increased default premium 
consistent with Fama and French’s (1992) interpretation of value as a distress factor. 
As a practical matter, this confirms the practical wisdom of incorporating a default 
risk screen on any investment strategy designed to exploit the observed value 
premium. 
4 Conclusion 
This research creates an innovative platform to analyze the impact of the negative BE 
stocks on the value premium, HML, by appropriately classifying these stocks into 
value groups. Both practitioners and academics usually discard negative BE stocks 
from any subsequent analysis. This omission is significant. By using past returns to 
classify these stocks into appropriate value strata, we show that once included, 
negative BE stocks significantly enhance the HML premium. We believe the reason 
for this is that many negative BE stocks are, in fact, in financial distress. If we 
interpret the HML premium as some kind of default premium, then to the extent that 
negative BE stocks have higher default risk than other stocks, we should expect that 
the HML premium would increase when these stocks are included. Indeed our results 
show that including these stocks leads to an increase in the value premium that is both 
statistically and economically significant. Although we illustrate how this approach 
can be used to classify negative book equity stock, the approach is quite general and 
may be used whenever particular accounting data are unavailable or otherwise suspect. 
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